


# Rethinking Helsinki: Engaging the Past to Motivate the Present

## OSCE by All Pilot Project Final Report

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**Historians**  
without Borders in Finland

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## Introductory Words

*Bradley Reynolds*

The OSCE by All pilot project, implemented by the organization Historians without Borders in Finland (hereafter HwB), ran from January 2024 until May 2025. OSCE by All was an attempt to engage Finnish civil society actors and citizens more broadly and motivate interest in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as a unique, comprehensive security organization.

Comprehensive security indicates that there are multiple issues that influence security, insecurity, and ultimately, the well-being of citizens. Today, this is reflected in the OSCE's three dimensions of security: the politico-military, the economic and environmental, and the human dimensions. Comprehensive security indicates that all three dimensions are overlapping and interrelated – a mentality that many experts fear is being forgotten as rearmament and hard security, or security based on the number of weapons a country has, takes priority.

The objective of this publication is to outline the efforts undertaken in the OSCE by All pilot project and present lessons learned from ongoing civil society–state cooperation in Finland. These conclusions have implications for Finnish politics, but also civil society engagement in OSCE participating States more broadly. It is our hope that this project will help shine a light on the need for broader interest and support for comprehensive security and the unique knowledge created in civil society in countries from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The OSCE is just one avenue for maintaining and building resilient societies, but we hope this pilot offers food for thought to others who are working on similar issues.

The main project team consisted of myself, Bradley Reynolds, along with Suvi Jaakkola, and Heta Hedman. Louis Clerc and Marko Lehti acted as implementation partners at different stages of the project. Johanna Ketola was also a founding member and participated in implementation during the first grant funding period (January - April 2024). I would like to thank everyone who participated in the conception and implementation of this project for their support and motivation

**Bradley Reynolds** (PhD) is a senior researcher at the University of Turku, a board member of Historians without Borders in Finland, and a board member as well as treasurer of the Finnish Oral History Network. He is a researcher of oral history, international history, and memory studies. Reynolds primarily focus on European security politics in the 1990s and post-Cold War transitions, looking at changes and continuities in policy making cultures, geo-political imaginaries, and the role of civil society in foreign policy making.





# Rethinking Civil Society Participation in the OSCE: Owning Engagement

Bradley Reynolds

## Lessons Learned

- Owning Engagement - civil society actors should own engagement in the OSCE. While Finland as Chairperson for 2025 has done much to remotivate civil society networks through the OSCE, the sustainability of civil society participation must be founded in civil society itself. Owning Engagement is broken down into three subcategories – Long-Term, Comprehensive, and Cooperative.
- Long-Term Engagement – sustained civil society engagement with the OSCE should be promoted through a mentorship and training programme. This would be an opportunity to prepare a new generation for civil society leaders with a foundation in OSCE politics and networks.
- Comprehensive Engagement – youth, female, and other marginal groups should be better incorporated into OSCE civil society discussions. While this has been an aim of the Finnish Chairpersonship, and the OSCE more generally, finding ways for civil society organizations to take ownership of this priority themselves is important for the longevity of this policy.
- Cooperative Engagement – the new OSCE Network model could better connect experts and civil society actors to produce targeted, action oriented research. Best practices from different national contexts related to, for example, maintaining open civic space could then be shared between national OSCE Networks.

## A Shrinking Civic Space

Over the past two decades, civil society organizations have been warning of authoritarian consolidation and the subsequent impacts on open civic space across the globe.<sup>1</sup> In parallel, political scientists now argue that democracy has declined globally since the 1990s, even among “wealthy nations.”<sup>2</sup> Former U.S. President Joe Biden began the “Summit of Democracies” in 2021 to respond to these global trends.

Despite renewed interest from state actors in the future of democracy, space for civil societies continues to shrink worldwide. Analysts argue that rather than asserting the value of democracy in economic and geopolitical terms, focus should remain on the value of democracy as the “only political system that institutionalizes protections for minority voices while also protecting the rights of journalists, citizens, and opposition leaders to criticize their government.”<sup>3</sup>

These debates are of relevance, but not necessarily new, for practitioners and participants of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). For example, a renewed debate over prioritizing state security over human security has been ongoing in OSCE politics for the past decade or so.<sup>4</sup> A critical part of the so-called ‘crisis of the OSCE’ is asking, *whose* security does the organization actually support?<sup>5</sup>

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- 1 Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2024: The Mounting Damage of Flawed Elections and Armed Conflict*, 27, [https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/FIW\\_2024\\_DigitalBooklet.pdf](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/FIW_2024_DigitalBooklet.pdf); Buyse, Antonie (2018): “Squeezing Civic Space: Restrictions on Civil Society Organizations and the Linkages with Human Rights,” *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 22(8): 966–988.
  - 2 Dean, James (2024): “Democratic Decline a Global Phenomenon, Even in Wealthy Nations,” *Cornell Chronical*, 17 January. <https://news.cornell.edu/stories/2024/01/democratic-decline-global-phenomenon-even-wealthy-nations>.
  - 3 Pepinsky, Thomas (2021): “Biden’s Summit for Democracy Should Focus on Rights, Not Economics and Geopolitics,” *Brookings Institute*, 22 November. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/bidens-summit-for-democracy-should-focus-on-rights-not-economics-and-geopolitics/>.
  - 4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland (2014): *Creating a Security Community for the Benefit of Everyone Priorities of the 2014 Swiss Chairmanship*. <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/4/103339.pdf>.
  - 5 Reynolds, Bradley & Ketola, Johanna (2022): “The OSCE and a 21st Century Spirit of Helsinki: Opportunities to Shift Security Back to the People,” *Finnish Institute for International Affairs*, no. 346. <https://fia.fi/en/publication/the-osce-and-a-21st-century-spirit-of-helsinki>.

The OSCE by All project was therefore an attempt to think about work civil society actors can do, in cooperation with state actors, to begin addressing the crisis of democracy. The OSCE by All pilot project, implemented as a three-stage project by the organization Historians without Borders in Finland (hereafter HwB), ran from January 2024 until May 2025.<sup>6</sup> The main project objective was to creatively experiment and consider how the OSCE might be used in supporting a resilient civic space across Eurasia.

Working with civil society actors in Finland, as well as other transnational civil society actors in the leadup to the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, offered a unique opportunity for two reasons. First, the Finnish Government established the Civil Society Organization (CSO) Strategy 2023-2027, in line with larger EU Commission initiatives. This strategy intended to promote cooperative goal setting and greater civil society participation in public decision-making.

Secondly, Finland as Chairperson of the OSCE for 2025 offered a unique opportunity to remember the value of civil society activism and transnational cooperation over the past 50 years. This was due to a unique culture of commemoration related to the Helsinki Final Act and the significance of the CSCE for Finland, which thus presented an interesting opportunity to promote the use of historical knowledge in decision-making.<sup>7</sup>

The remainder of the paper first introduces a brief discussion of two key challenges with OSCE engagement - visibility and motivation. Secondly, the three stages of the OSCE by All project are presented in the form of thematic analysis to cull lessons learned from working with Finnish and transnational civil society organizations on OSCE themes. Then, brief conclusions are offered to reflect on the implications these lessons learned might have for remotivating civil society engagement through the OSCE.

## OSCE (dis)Engagement

One of the main difficulties of interdimensional civil society engagement in OSCE politics stems from the informal nature of the organization. Proceeding from this premise, when no one knows of the substantial work the OSCE does, the organization is easily written off as “in crisis,” irrelevant, or simply an organization where Russia spreads its propaganda.<sup>8</sup>

One of the first steps in revitalizing the OSCE is “securing more political attention for the” organization.<sup>9</sup> Leonard Schuette and Hylke Dijkstra conclude that “without greater political attention and investment by capitals,” any political recommendations will not be successful.<sup>10</sup> Revitalizing the OSCE thus requires motivating a new, diverse set of actors and publics to engage with the organization.

This lack of attention has been termed a “crisis of visibility.”<sup>11</sup> OSCE PA parliamentarians, for example, complain that the actions of the OSCE are not visible enough even to their own govern-

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6 Funding for the OSCE by All project came from grant funding awarded through an open call from the Finnish Foreign Ministry's Human Rights Department (Pol-40), as well as from a contract of services from the Finnish OSCE Task Force for 2025. In addition to grant and contract funding, substantial volunteer hours were used by HwB board members and most members of the project to fulfill quality implementation.

7 Möttölä, Kari (1999): “Finland and the OSCE: The Significance of the OSCE for Finnish Foreign and Security Policy,” In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 1998 (Baden-Baden 1999):145-164; Reynolds, Bradley (2021): “The Spirit of Helsinki at 50: Contemplating Commemoration,” Security and Human Rights Monitor, 22 September. <https://www.shrmonitor.org/the-spirit-of-helsinki-at-50-contemplating-commemoration/>.

8 Ortama, Simo (2025): “Näin Suomi päätyi johtamaan järjestöä, jossa Venäjä levittää propagandaansa” [This is how Finland ended up leading the organisation where Russia spreads its propaganda] Yle, 23 January. <https://yle.fi/a/74-20136825>.

9 Zellner, Wolfgang (2020): “Using the OSCE More Effectively – Ideas and Recommendations,” CORE/IFSH Center for OSCE Research of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. White Paper for the German Federal Foreign Office, 8.

10 Schuette, Leonard and Dijkstra, Hylke (2023): “When an International Organization Fails to Legitimate: The Decline of the OSCE,” *Global Studies Quarterly* (3)8: 1-13.

11 Schuette and Dijkstra 2023, 8, 10.



ments and have “asked for tools to help them advocate for the OSCE to their foreign ministers.”<sup>12</sup> Former Secretary General of the OSCE Lamberto Zannier summed up these challenges by stating, “because of the inherent complexity of the OSCE and the long-term nature of its work, it is a challenge for the Organization to project an active and strong image that would attract sustained attention in the capitals of participating States and raise awareness among the general public.”<sup>13</sup>

This then leads to the second problem - motivation in civil society to utilize the OSCE’s networks and expertise. This has led to a predicament where civil society activists interested in the OSCE are largely those who remember the positive role the OSCE played in helping end the Cold War and transforming Europe in the 1990s. Today, a younger generation may not have those positive experiences or memories of great historic events with which the OSCE is associated. These memories can be considered critical for associating the OSCE with hope for a better future.

A lack of motivation is further accentuated by the informality of the organization. How to approach the OSCE is as important as considering the substance the organization works with. When a lack of visibility is mixed with informality, the OSCE becomes a difficult organization to engage with, or even find entry points for participation.

As such, OSCE by All was an experiment in creating plausible entry points for people who have not previously engaged with the organization. OSCE by All also offered an opportunity for established OSCE experts, scholars, and decision-makers to welcome a new generation into the OSCE family. This OSCE by All pilot was thus an opportunity to experiment with the policy recommendation that “non-OSCE experts should be incorporated more openly into reform discussions,” as well as OSCE politics more generally.<sup>14</sup>

It should be noted, that the OSCE Secretariat and participating State delegations have implemented numerous programs in recent years to address both of these problems. This includes the Scholarship for Peace and Security in the OSCE area, Model OSCE, and an increased social media campaign to highlight the achievements of the organization. These are all long-term strategies and the implications will be seen with time. Parallel initiatives from civil society should be produced on their own, to cover more bases for the future work of the OSCE, as well as transnational civil society.

## OSCE by All – Lessons Learned

### Who is Responsible for the Future of European Security?

Project implementation began with initial interviews in stage one (January – May 2024). Over 20 Finnish decision-makers, civil society representatives, and experts were interviewed regarding their expectations and aspirations for Finland’s 2025 OSCE Chairpersonship, as well as European security cooperation more generally. Due to the lack of visibility of the OSCE in Finnish public discourse, the project was well received by most respondents and thus, effectively stimulated debate – an initial objective of the project. Interviewee statements are presented in this report anonymously.

Two main themes emerged from the interviews. First, the Finnish OSCE chairpersonship was considered an opportunity to reopen security policy debate beyond a simplistic dichotomy of hard vs human security. Many actors were fearful that the Finnish security policy debate was too focused on increasing defense spending at the expense of the various other aspects of security Finland previously emphasized (gender, environment, arms control, peace mediation, etc.). Thus,

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12 OSCE PA (2023): “REPORT Call for Action - Helsinki + 50 Meeting ‘Future Challenges for the OSCE,’” 31 May. <https://www.oscepa.org/en/documents/osce-call-for-action/highlights-from-meetings/4700-report-call-for-action-helsinki-50-meeting-future-challenges-for-the-osce-31-may-2023/file>.

13 Zannier, Lamberto (2018): “A Stronger OSCE for an Uncertain Future.” *OSCE Yearbook 2017*. 48-49.

14 Reynolds and Ketola 2022, 5.

remembering the OSCE's concept of comprehensive security was seen as a positive contribution to Finnish foreign and security policy debates. The second main theme was a general difficulty for interviewees to imagine any future beyond the war in Ukraine. Russia's war of aggression significantly limited the imagination of what kind of European security architecture was desirable for the future.

Interviewees also offered thoughts on how to better consider the OSCE in Finnish politics. First, many interview participants wanted there to be more public debate on the OSCE, informing citizens of Finland's chairpersonship of the OSCE in 2025. While the media did not much cover the OSCE in 2024, coverage substantially improved in early 2025 during the opening of the Chairpersonship, in part due to Finnish Foreign Ministry efforts.

These efforts were paralleled by an increase of events in early 2025 discussing the OSCE from non-state actors, such as the Paasikivi foundation, the University of Helsinki, as well as the film community with a documentary titled 'The Helsinki Effect'. The difficulty in 2024 of motivating interest in the impending Chairpersonship was useful for the OSCE by All project team to reconceptualize how to effectively plan events for the chairpersonship year, as early on it seemed there would be no high-level commemoration of the 50 year anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act.

Secondly, in echoing previous policy recommendations, it was presented that if new ideas and analysis of the OSCE were desired, parties with a critical distance from the everyday life of Vienna and foreign ministries should be included in OSCE discussions. In achieving this end, it was suggested a writing competition and/or workshops could be organized to support interest in the OSCE, as well as promote new voices in the discussion. The specific theme of a new 'spirit of Helsinki' was proposed.

In addressing these recommendations, in Winter 2024 HwB began planning a conference with Polish civil society partners from European Network Remembrance and Solidarity (ENRS) for June 2025 in Helsinki. After initial meetings, it was decided that ENRS, in cooperation with the University of Helsinki and HwB, would hold ENRS' marquee conference with participants from all over Europe and North America, European Remembrance Symposium, in Helsinki.<sup>15</sup> The main theme of the symposium, held 10-13 June 2025, was the spirit of Helsinki then and now.

Interviews also offered reflections on broader OSCE engagement with civil society organizations. While previous works of the author focused mainly on civil society in the Black Sea Region, South Caucasus, and Central Asia, the OSCE by All project underlined a need to also consider how to more openly incorporate Finnish civil society actors, the media, and expert community into OSCE politics. It is not only foreign ministries that neglect the OSCE, but civil society actors, experts, as well as journalists, in numerous OSCE participating States. In Finland, for example, there is no Helsinki committee that would focus exclusively on OSCE issues, and having a Finnish organization attend the Human Dimension Conference (formerly Meetings) is a challenge. This was seen for a multitude of reasons, ranging from a lack of funding to pervasive participation of Government NGOs from other OSCE participating States, watering down the effectiveness of meetings. Effectively, few Finnish NGOs saw participation in the OSCE, or OSCE networks, as valuable for their own national work.

One recommendation here could be improving the new OSCE Network model to cooperatively engage experts and civil society actors to combine targeted research with civic action. This could act as a bulwark against shrinking civic spaces, and best practices for action-oriented knowledge production could then be shared between national OSCE.

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15 Spirit of Helsinki Then and Now website: <https://enrs.eu/edition/european-remembrance-symposium-2025>.

## Situating Engagement – Timing and Context

Stage two (June – November 2024) began in a context of the Finnish government announcing cuts of over one million euros to non-governmental organizations working on themes of human rights, as well as foreign and security policy. At the same time, the government proposed that Finland as OSCE chair in 2025 would be a beacon of hope to support human rights defenders across Eurasia.<sup>16</sup> While the funding cuts were not received well by the national media or civil society representatives,<sup>17</sup> it was part of the CSO Strategy 2023-2027. One objective of this program was to motivate Finnish NGOs to obtain EU, international, as well as private foundation funding, as opposed to Finnish government funding, which has been a primary source of civil society support in the country.<sup>18</sup>

Within this context, the first public presentation of the OSCE by All project was a public discussion on 30 August 2024 at Eurooppa-foorumi [Europe forum], a premier forum for debating Europe in Finland. By utilizing the prism of history, OSCE by All organized a panel discussion between civil society representatives, government officials, and researchers titled “Beacon of Hope – OSCE and Civil Society at Home and Abroad, Past and Future.”

In the panel, it was noted that civil society and researchers need to act as a bridge between the past and the future in times of crisis, as they did in 1975.<sup>19</sup> CSCE civil society networks were fundamental during the Cold War for not only promoting civil rights activism East of the iron curtain, but in North American and European societies as well. It was because prominent members of the U.S. foreign policy elite connected domestic and foreign human rights policy in the 1960s, during the U.S. civil rights movements, that America became a beacon of hope for human rights defenders around the world.<sup>20</sup>

The Eurooppa-foorumi panel format allowed an innovative way to support Finnish civil society organizations as they attempted to contest government funding cuts, also allowing government officials to engage with critiques of the government program. This fulfilled the Finnish CSO Strategy 2023-2027 as well as the EU Commission’s goal to support “civil society actors to participate in public decision-making.”<sup>21</sup>



The second main aspect of stage two was organizing and implementing an international workshop at the University of Helsinki on 5 November 2024. This was organized in cooperation with Civic Solidarity Platform (CSP), a union of over 100 civil society organizations working with the OSCE in more than 30 countries.<sup>22</sup> The Helsinki workshop was the second of five intended workshops comprising the Helsinki +50 Process, a civil society initiated reflection process in prepara-

16 Poslo, Matti (2024): “Suomi haluaa nyt rohkaista vapautta janoavia kansoja” [Finland now wants to encourage nations thirsting for freedom], *Turun Sanomat* [Turku Post], March 28, <https://www.ts.fi/uutiset/6285429>.

17 Aaltonen, Joona (2024): Ulkoministeriö leikkaamassa tuet Martti Ahtisaaren ja Elisabeth Rehnin perustamilta järjestöiltä,” [Foreign Ministry to cut subsidies to organisations founded by Martti Ahtisaari and Elisabeth Rehn], 22 May. <https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/art-2000010444251.html>.

18 Finnish Ministry of Justice (2023): “Kansalaisjärjestöstrategia 2023–2027 : Valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös kansalaisjärjestöjen toimintaedellytysten kehittämisestä [CSO Strategy 2023–2027 Government resolution on the development of civic space],” Publications of the Ministry of Justice, Memorandums and statements 2024:22, <https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/165689>.

19 Historians without Borders in Finland (2024): “Toivon majakka – ETYJ ja kansalaisyhteiskunta kotimaassa ja ulkomailla, menneessä ja tulevaisuudessa” [Beacon of Hope – OSCE and Civil Society at Home and Abroad, Past and Future,], Eurooppa-foorumi, 30 August. <https://historianswithoutborders.fi/en/tapahtumat/beacon-of-hope-osce-and-civil-society-at-home-and-abroad-past-and-future>.

20 Snyder, Sarah, *From Selma to Moscow How Human Rights Activists Transformed U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 11.

21 Finnish Ministry of Justice 2023, 24; EU Commission (2022): “EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Annual Report Looks at Role of Civil Society and Underlines Need to Increase Support,” 6 December. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_22\\_7521](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_7521).

22 See: <https://civicsolidarity.org/>

tion for the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the OSCE in summer 2025.

The Helsinki workshop was titled “Environmental Security and the OSCE” and focused on OSCE environmental and economic issues. The workshop brought together over 20 experts and civil society actors from OSCE participating States including, but not limited to: Belgium, Canada, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Kyrgyzstan, the Netherlands, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and the U.S.

The workshop was framed with a comparative historical perspective on Finnish and Ukrainian environmental degradation during war (WWII and the Ukraine War/Russian War of Aggression). This highlighted the relevance of a Finnish perspective on the interrelationship of environmental issues, war, and peace, which created a beneficial atmosphere for collaboration. International participants were happy to learn from the award-winning work of Finnish environmental civil society participants. Finnish participants, in turn, were happy to have a new perspective on environmental civil society work from colleagues in, for example, Central Asia.

The “Environmental Security and the OSCE” workshop worked two-fold. First, a workshop report, which included policy recommendations to the Finnish Task Force for 2025, was distributed to civil society partners in Finland and abroad, as well as OSCE delegations in Vienna.<sup>23</sup> Recommendations were focused on how to better connect the second (environmental and economic) with the third (human) dimension, as well as how to support civil society actors working with climate/environmental issues. Second, from a national perspective, the workshop offered a gateway to OSCE politics and networks for Finnish NGOs who work on environmental issues, but have not previously engaged with the Organization.

Finnish civil society actors had a newfound interest in the OSCE’s work on climate, environment, and security as a result of the workshop, which led to continued cooperation. For example, HwB and Safer Climate presented the work of the Environmental Security and the OSCE workshop at The Atmosphere and Climate Competence Center (ACCC) annual impact week in April 2025 in Helsinki. The same month HwB also organized an OSCE side event in Vienna with Bir Duino Kyrgyzstan and the Netherlands Helsinki Committee titled “Helsinki+50 From Below? Building Bottom-Up Approaches for Climate Resilience.”

Another important reflection of the “Environmental Security and the OSCE” workshop was the need to promote more diverse civil society networks. This is directly relevant for considering how civil society participation in the OSCE will continue for the next 50 years. For example, a specific mentorship program, complementary to or further incorporated into initiatives such as Recharging Advocacy for Rights in Europe (RARE), organized by the Hertie School in Berlin, should be considered.<sup>24</sup> A specific mentorship and training programmes on how to utilize the OSCE (how to advocate with delegations in Vienna, how to work with field missions, how to engage national governments, etc.), could be a valuable tool for civil society actors to better advocate for and utilize the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security across the entire OSCE region. This would also be a start of long-term planning for civil society engagement with the OSCE.



23 Reynolds, Bradley; Jaakkola, Suv; and Hedman, Heta (2024): “Environmental Security and the OSCE Historians without Borders in Finland and Civic Solidarity Platform Workshop Helsinki +50 Reflection Process Policy Recommendations to the Finnish OSCE Task Force,” *Historians without Borders in Finland*, November 2024, [https://historianswithoutborders.fi/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Environmental-Security-and-the-OSCE-Report-12\\_24.pdf](https://historianswithoutborders.fi/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Environmental-Security-and-the-OSCE-Report-12_24.pdf).

24 See: <https://www.hertie-school.org/en/customised/rare>.



## New Openings

Stage three (November 2024 – April 2025) included the production of a student paper series where four students as young professionals wrote small policy-relevant papers on OSCE history and politics. The intention was to address the problematique of a decreased interest in the OSCE due to its nature as a difficult organization to gain access to, as well as understanding of.

Students were recruited from the University of Turku, University of Helsinki, and University of Tampere. The themes of the papers, written in Finnish and English, were OSCE small arms and light weapons policy in the Western Balkans from a historical perspective, the historical development of an intersectional OSCE anti-human trafficking policy, a historical analysis of Finnish media coverage of Finnish OSCE policy, and a comparison of the Finnish 2008 and 2025 Chairpersonship priorities.

This broad array of topics helped address another issue in OSCE politics, where focus on a few key issues only reinforces the low visibility of the organization. Discussing the numerous relevant issues the OSCE deals with, such as arms control (despite current stagnation), conflict prevention and management, and competing spheres of economic integration are considered essential to improving interest in the organization.<sup>25</sup> In short, a wider understanding of OSCE politics helps non-OSCE experts understand *why* the Finnish Foreign Ministry continues to argue that if the OSCE did not exist, it would need to be built.

Stage three thus worked three-fold. It was an introduction to 1) OSCE politics for a younger generation, 2) civil society work, and 3) publishing as part of a professional academic career (all authors were financially compensated). Point one required authors to engage extensively with OSCE policy material from national delegations, governments, as well as OSCE institutions and field operations. Some authors also conducted interviews with diplomats and OSCE experts. Point two was an attempt to show how this could be done from both a research, as well as a civil society perspective. Finally, point three was an attempt to construct a new entry point to OSCE politics and research for students who had not previously engaged extensively with the organization.

These reports were published as a series title *The OSCE Past and Present*, on the HwB website, promoting public discussion of Finnish foreign policy history and raising the visibility of the Finnish 2025 Chairpersonship. In connecting stage one and stage three, the idea of a writing competition on the OSCE was somewhat reflected in these student papers, showing that there are many innovative ways new voices can be included into OSCE politics if political will is present.

## Conclusions

One of the key findings from the OSCE by All project was that there is a need to re-develop an OSCE knowledge base not only in transnational civil society, but also in Finland. Mentorship and research are two approaches that could begin to address this challenge.

First, OSCE specific civil society mentorship and training programmes would help plant seeds for the future. Secondly, as has been noted in academic literature, much research on contemporary civil society is in the form of policy recommendations (as seen here).<sup>26</sup> However, to better understand the needs and limitations of existing transnational civil society work, more comprehensive research is needed. This would also help operationalize the unique knowledge creation and experiences of civil society actors across Eurasia in an era of shrinking civic space.

Despite the critiques raised here, the current Chairpersonship has shown an innovative strategy to begin addressing many of these shortcomings. This can be seen through the establishment of new

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<sup>25</sup> Zellner 2020, 14.

<sup>26</sup> Buyse 2018.

Chairpersonship Special Representative positions, new media campaigns to increase visibility, promotion of the OSCE Network model, and support for the OSCE by All project, just to name a few.

Ongoing civil society engagement with the OSCE after 2025 will be one measure of how well the 2025 Finnish chairpersonship succeeded. The OSCE is a premier organization to connect with societies in Eurasia. As the OSCE by All project has shown, these networks offer unique reflection, opportunities, and knowledge creation potential for both international as well as Finnish civil society actors. This is a point often deemphasized in political and academic discussions of the OSCE and would be a valuable counterpoint to critiques of the OSCE only working East of Vienna.<sup>27</sup> Civil society in all OSCE participating States must see the OSCE as a useful resource if the organization, and not only the chairpersonship, is to remain a lighthouse of hope for human rights defenders across Eurasia.

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27 Van der Stoep, Max (2005): "OSCE—Looking Back and Looking Forward," *Helsinki Monitor* 16(3): 204–208; Zagorski, Andrei (2005): "Make the OSCE Institutions Less Dependent on Politics, Not More," *Helsinki Monitor* 16(3): 209–213.

## Environmental Security and the OSCE

*Bradley Reynolds, Suvi Jaakkola, Heta Hedman*

### Policy Recommendations

Finland as CiO in 2025 could:

- Create a thematic focus on civil society engagement for the second dimension to direct work in the policy area in 2025.
- Explore ways to capitalize on Central Asian and South Caucasus governments' interest in environmental cooperation, but also how to reincorporate the work of national and international NGOs operating in contexts that have become increasingly limited.
- Acknowledge civil society actors as knowledge producers in addressing environmental and climate security risks. Consider avenues to better incorporate this complementary knowledge production into OSCE decision-making structures. For example, a civil society representative at Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) meetings or the Group of Friends on the Environment could be useful.
- Link the mandates of the CiO Special Representative on Climate Security and CiO Special Representative on Civil Society in line with the OSCE comprehensive security concept.
- Mandate the CiO Special Representative on Climate Security to cooperate with the UN Special Rapporteur on Environmental Defenders under the Aarhus Convention.
- Create a public-facing platform, publication series, or social media campaign highlighting environmental defenders from around the OSCE area to both protect environmental defenders, but also promote OSCE visibility on this critical issue.

### Workshop Background

Historians without Borders in Finland, in cooperation with Civic Solidarity Platform, implemented the workshop “Environmental Security and the OSCE” on 5 November 2024 at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki. The workshop, funded by the Finnish Foreign Ministry and part of the OSCE by All project at Historians without Borders in Finland,<sup>1</sup> assembled over 20 experts and civil society actors from OSCE participating States including, but not limited to: Belgium, Canada, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Kyrgyzstan, the Netherlands, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and the U.S. The workshop included three thematic sessions focusing on: OSCE second dimension work, the climate crisis as an intersectional challenge, and civil society and environmental justice. The workshop was held under Chatham House Rules.

The participant composition and broad thematic focus helped achieve two main goals. The former supported our objective of discussing OSCE issues more comprehensively from Vancouver to Vladivostok, while the latter motivated Finnish environmental NGOs not acquainted with the OSCE to take more interest in the institution's work in the second dimension leading up to 2025.

### Developing the OSCE Second Dimension

The workshop, as well as scientific literature, highlights that the second dimension of the OSCE is the broadest and arguably most underused basket. Work in this dimension, however, has developed over the past 20 years. This workshop highlighted that significant issues remain to be addressed in developing the second dimension as an integral piece of an OSCE comprehensive security model.

Since 2014 second dimension work has been increasingly tied to Chairperson-in-Office initiatives.

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1 For more on the OSCE by All project, see: <https://historianswithoutborders.fi/en/programs-and-projects/osce-by-all>.

In 2021, Sweden as CiO was significantly able to obtain consensus on a ministerial decision to encourage participating States to “identify, raise awareness of, mitigate and adapt to climate-related challenges.” Dialogue and cooperation were noted as necessary to minimize the economic, social, and environmental impacts of climate change.<sup>2</sup> Additional support has come from the OSCE Group of Friends of Environment, founded in 2019 by France, Switzerland, and the UK. The aim was to strengthen cooperation on environmental issues as part of a broader effort to prevent conflicts, build mutual confidence, and promote good neighbourly relations.<sup>3</sup>

Despite this progress, experts have chided the OSCE for a lack of a “clear thematic approach” to climate security.<sup>4</sup> Despite focus among civil society actors themselves, little policy analysis focuses on the role of civil society in addressing environmental and climate issues. This combination would have added value within the OSCE context.

The Finnish Chairpersonship for 2025 could create a thematic focus combining the work of civil society and environment to motivate future second dimension work. Initiatives that promote environmental resilience as a key factor in societal and economic resilience could be one thematic focus. Civil societies’ role in maintaining the integrity of climate data (e.g., air quality and soil quality monitoring, etc.) should also be underlined.

One of the main added values of the OSCE in a broader European security architecture is its close cooperation with civil society actors. The OSCE is sometimes criticized for being an institution of sandwiches and seminars. However, workshop participants noted that civil society seminars are one of the few remaining forums where Russian and Ukrainian participants still interact. These networks are important for regional civil society cooperation post-Ukraine War.

Secondly, the OSCE has added value as a specific form of knowledge production in addressing environmental and climate issues. This knowledge production is seen as an objective of the OSCE.<sup>5</sup> So far, this has mostly focused on research, but knowledge production in civil society should be considered significant. Workshops such as “Environmental Security and the OSCE” are one example of how to focus civil society contributions to OSCE politics in Vienna.

In pursuit of this goal, the Finnish CiO could consider avenues to better incorporate civil society actors into OSCE decision-making structures, as well as how to give appropriate feedback to civil society leaders so that they can refine their advocacy with OSCE relevant language. A rotating civil society representative at OCEEA meetings or the Group of Friends on the Environment could further connect diplomatic and civil society discussions on environment and climate.

One additional area where the OSCE would have a logical contribution is in defending environmental defenders, publicly, as well as through the OSCE’s unique form of “quiet diplomacy.” Currently, there is widespread concern that civil society work in the field of environment is increasingly dangerous. Over 2100 environmental and land defenders have been killed around the world since 2012. This does not include imprisonments and reprisals.

According to international civil society representatives, the space for environmental information data collection and tracking the impact of environmental risks and climate change on populations has significantly narrowed in the past 20 years. State harassment and imprisonment are just some of the consequences. The numerous foreign agent laws in Central Asia and the South Caucasus

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2 OSCE, “Strengthening Co-operation to Address the Challenges Caused by Climate Change,” MC/Decision no. 3/21, 3 December 2021.

3 Smolnik, Franziska (2019): “Cooperation, Trust, Security? The Potential and Limits of the OSCE’s Economic and Environmental Dimension,” SWP Research Paper, No. 16/2019, *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)*, Berlin, Germany, 15.

4 Barnhoorn, Anniek (2023): “Comparing responses to Climate-Related Security Risks Among The EU, NATO and the OSCE,” *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri)*, Stockholm, Sweden, 15.

5 Ibid, 22.



limit the scope of international support for civil society and environmental defenders.<sup>6</sup>

The Finnish CiO should explore ways to maintain interest in environmental and climate security initiatives from Central Asian governments, but also how to reincorporate the work of national and international NGOs. One recommendation is to convince Central Asian and South Caucasus countries that cooperation with environmental NGOs is vital to building resilient societies.

Like Malta as 2024 CiO, Finland is expected to appoint two separate CiO special representatives on climate as well as civil society. The Finnish CiO should link these mandates to better incorporate second dimension initiatives into the OSCE comprehensive security model.

The mandate of the CiO Special Representative on Climate Security should also be mandated to cooperate with the UN Special Rapporteur on Environmental Defenders under the Aarhus Convention. A longer-term mandate like the UN Special Rapporteur should be investigated to institutionalize OSCE support for environmental defenders in line with the Helsinki Decalogue.

In line with this recommendation and building off the idea of civil society as a unique community of knowledge production, the stories of people who suffer the most from climate change and environmental disasters need to be made visible and supported by the OSCE. Creating a public-facing platform, publication series, or social media campaign highlighting environmental defenders from around the OSCE area and their work could be a useful strategy to promote environmental security as a cross-dimensional issue. This would also promote OSCE visibility.

## Conclusions

Finland as CiO, in promoting second dimension work in 2025, needs to walk a line between defending the integrity of the Helsinki Decalogue as well as environmental defenders, and working with participating States to maintain their interest in second dimension issues. This will not be a simple task. This workshop was fruitful in thinking about not only second dimension issues, but OSCE added value overall. Motivating people from outside the second dimension in OSCE politics to take interest in environmental and economic issues will benefit the institution overall. Increased cross-basket work will develop the vitality and dynamism of OSCE discussions going forward.

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Picture: Julia Palmu

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6 U.S. Helsinki Commission (2024): "Contesting Russia: Preparing for the Long-Term Russia Threat: A Report by the U.S. Helsinki Commission Staff," *U.S. Helsinki Commission*. Washington D.C., 22. <https://www.csce.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Contesting-Russia-Report-2.pdf>.



## The OSCE Past and Present – OSCE by All Student Paper Series

As a final section of the OSCE by All project, Historians without Borders in Finland curated a student policy-recommendation paper series in support of the 2025 Finnish Chairpersonship. The series looks at the OSCE's added value in the European security architecture, as well as Finland's engagement with the OSCE. We hoped to offer both an entry point for a younger generation to create their own interest and understanding of the institution, as well as a valuable contribution to national and international discussions on the OSCE.

Students were recruited from the University of Turku, University of Tampere, and University of Helsinki. The themes of the papers, written in Finnish and English, are OSCE small arms and light weapons policy in the Western Balkans from a historical perspective, the historical development of an intersectional OSCE anti-human trafficking policy, a historical analysis of Finnish media coverage of Finnish OSCE policy, and a comparison of the Finnish 2008 and 2025 Chairpersonship priorities.

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## Finland's 2025 OSCE Chairpersonship: Opportunities for Gender-Responsive Arms Control. An analysis of Gendered Dimensions of Small Arms Control in the Western Balkans.

Rani Deleersnijder

### Policy Recommendations

To facilitate greater comprehensive security in Small Arms and Light Weapons work, Finland as OSCE Chairperson in 2025 should Listen, Co-operate, Merge, and Think Ahead:

- Listen: low-threshold workshops to map concerns around small arms abuse and raise awareness around the gendered dimension of gun ownership and misuse.
- Co-operate: strengthen ties with regional and local organisations working with a gender perspective on gun small arms proliferation and misuse.
- Merge: towards intersectional, and comprehensive security. Low-threshold initiatives cross-cutting OSCE dimensions (political-military, environmental and economic, and human rights) would support work towards an intersectional, gender-sensitive arms control policies.
- Think Ahead: Structural, patriarchal gender norms must be addressed in security policies as they negatively impact the ownership and misuse of small arms.

Finland as OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Chairpersonship for 2025 stresses resilience as one of its core themes.<sup>1</sup> This paper will explore one specific aspect of resilience: resilience against arms proliferation. The OSCE has historically been active on this topic within the region of the Western Balkans. According to estimations of civilian-owned weapons by Small Arms Survey (SAS), five countries in the Western Balkan rank in the top 25 worldwide.<sup>2</sup> The OSCE is a key actor in the region, with one-third of the OSCE Practical Assistance Projects on small arms and light weapons (SALW) focusing on the Western Balkans.<sup>3</sup>

This report will stress the gendered dimensions of SALW and encourage intersectional approaches to policy to strengthen resilience and security for everyone, regardless of gender. Taking a feminist peace perspective, this report stresses how gender influences security against gun violence.<sup>4</sup> The OSCE is an opportune platform to implement and perform gender-responsive arms control as gender is recognised in the OSCE's work on arms control and issues of equal representation.<sup>5</sup>

Four policy recommendations for Finland and the OSCE are organised around the following themes: listen, co-operate, merge and think ahead. 1) Listen - to the concerns of people in the area projects are aimed at. 2) Co-operate - with organisations working on the same issues in the region. 3) Merge - practices of arms control and gender equality. 4) Think ahead - small arms proliferation has consequences long after the formal end of conflict affecting genders differently.

As security policies increasingly prioritise hard security measures, it is vital to address the long-term, sometimes negative societal impacts these hard measures have. The Finnish chairperson-

1 OSCE. *Speech outlining 2025 Chairpersonship priorities by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Elina Valtonen*. [Press release] (2024) <https://www.osce.org/permanent-council/576519>.

2 Small Arms Survey. *Infographics on Global Firearms Holdings*. [Fact sheet] (2018) <https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-Infographics-global-firearms-holdings.pdf>.

3 For more information see: <https://salw.osce.org/>.

4 Feminist Peace Research is an interdisciplinary perspective that aims to highlight intersectional and structural inequalities shaping our world. Feminist peace allows researchers to investigate continuums of violence that remain present in peaceful societies in a myriad of ways. This analysis argues such a perspective would enrich and strengthen action as well as policies against arms proliferation and gun violence. Furthermore, Feminist Peace encourages conversations among different actors, both academic and political, to inspire social change, which is a core aim of this report. For more on Feminist Peace Research see: Élise, Féron & Tarja, Väyrynen, *Feminist peace research: An introduction*. Taylor & Francis, 2024; Tarja, Väyrynen, Swati, Parashar, Élise, Féron & Catia C., Confortini (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of feminist peace research*. Routledge, 2021.

5 OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Arms Control*. [Fact sheet] OSCE. 2023 <https://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/468291>. For more details on the workshop see: <https://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/566821>.



ship of the OSCE and the opportunity to chair the Forum for Security Co-operation in the final trimester of 2025 offers space to further integrate an intersectional, long-term approach to arms control.

## The Legacy of Conflict: Gendered Dimensions of Small Arms in the Western Balkans

The presence of small arms in the Western Balkans stems from the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s.<sup>6</sup> Despite ongoing efforts of small arms control and reduction of surplus stock, many weapons and their ammunition, trafficked during the Yugoslav Wars, remain in circulation in the region.<sup>7</sup> This resulted in a continued struggle with illegal possession, trafficking, and misuse of firearms.<sup>8</sup>

The OSCE is active in combating small arms trafficking and misuse in several countries in the region.<sup>9</sup> The OSCE involvement started after the Yugoslav Wars. In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), for example, the organisation has been active since 1995. The SALW mission in BiH was created to aid and secure the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>10</sup> The OSCE works together with the authorities and the United Nations Development Programmes' South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) to strengthen resilience against gun violence.

Research by SEESAC highlights policy shortcomings in addressing the gendered nature of SALW, which results in gender-specific risks related to gun violence.<sup>11</sup> Men make up the vast majority of SALW owners, perpetrators and victims across the region, but women disproportionately fall victim to domestic violence.<sup>12</sup> The presence of a gun in the house vastly increases the risk and lethality of domestic violence.<sup>13</sup> A person's gender is thus an important factor in when and where one might encounter armed violence. These are factors SALW policies need to better incorporate if truly resilient societies are to be supported.

## Towards a Resilient Future: Policy Pathways for Gender-Responsive Arms Control

How can the OSCE support action against these gendered dimensions of gun violence? From existing efforts of the OSCE's involvement in the Western Balkans, four recommendations were drawn to embed an intersectional approach in arms control programmes.

Listen - First, in order to gain an overview of the experiences and feelings of insecurity, it is crucial to listen to the general public. To this end, a workshop by the OSCE in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a suitable example.<sup>14</sup> In order to reach the wider population, media outlets were invited to participate. It is recognised that the media could form a bridge of communication and help in increasing awareness and security among civilians. This workshop made no mention of gender or any intersectional aspect of small arms. However, it did recognise the importance of - and willingness to reach out and listen to - civilians. Awareness of the gendered nature of small arms and help for those affected by Gender-Based Violence with the misuse of small arms could be raised in a similar manner by other OSCE institutions, such as the OSCE PA.

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6 Dragan Božanić, *Small arms control – The case for gender mainstreaming: Experiences from South-East Europe: Development Futures Series No. 29*. SEESAC, 2022.

7 Leslie Benson, *Yugoslavia: A concise history*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

8 Božanić, *Small arms control*, 2022.

9 For more information see: <https://www.osce.org/where-we-are>.

10 Ministerial Council. *Decision on OSCE action for peace, democracy and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. OSCE, 1995 <https://www.osce.org/mc/22231>; OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Arms control*. [Fact sheet] OSCE, 2023 <https://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/468291>.

11 Dragan Božanić. *Gender and SALW in South East Europe - Main concerns and policy response*. SEESAC, 2016; Božanić, *Small arms control*, 2022.

12 Božanić, *Gender and SALW*; Božanić, *Small arms control*; Vannesa Farr, Henri Myrntinen, & Albrecht Schnabel, *Sexed pistols: The gendered impacts of small arms and light weapons*. United Nations University Press, 2009; Myrntinen, *Connecting the dots: Arms control, disarmament and the women, peace and security agenda*. UNIDIR, 2020.

13 Giovanna Maletta. *Project insight - Firearm-related gender-based violence in the European Union*. SIPRI, n.d.; Marija Popović. *Small arms and light weapons, gender-based violence and domestic violence - Analysis of regulatory framework and practice*. UNDP, 2021.

14 For more details on the workshop see: <https://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/566821>.

Cooperation - The OSCE already works with organisations such as SEESAC in the region. Attention to gender is directly mentioned in The Roadmap for a Sustainable Solution to the Illegal Possession, Misuse and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Explosives in the Western Balkans by 2030, a regional agreement supported by the EU also working towards resilience against gun violence.<sup>15</sup> Increased OSCE cooperation with the UN, EU, as well as civil society, will further develop active efforts towards gender-responsive arms control.

Merge - Next, advancing intersectional approaches towards arms control can also take place within projects established by the OSCE. While both arms control and violence against women are objectives of the OSCE, only an integration of these issues will lead to comprehensive advancement. More security for everyone requires including factors such as gender in arms control policies. Gender is seen as a cross-cutting dimension, which means it is of relevance to all three OSCE dimensions: Politico-military, Economic and Environmental, and the Human dimensions. While the importance of inter-dimensional security, and attention to gender, has been addressed, it has not been fully implemented. To enhance resilience against gun violence for all, an intersectional perspective should also be present in the first dimension, which deals with arms control. Small initiatives, such as the workshop described above, could kickstart the integration of intersectional approaches to security-building.<sup>16</sup> Finland, as an advocate for inclusive practices of peacebuilding, has the opportunity to include an intersectional lens and lead such projects in the coming year.

Think Ahead - Small arms are an example of the long-term consequences of violent conflict. Violence doesn't disappear but rather transforms. Domestic violence for example often increases after conflict.<sup>17</sup> Issues of such continuums of violence should be at the centre of policy frameworks and activities around small arms. In order to build resilient and comprehensive policy frameworks and actions to combat SALW issues, the underlying structures of patriarchal gender norms and differentiated risks of SALW abuse related to gender must be recognised, addressed, and taken seriously.

## Comprehensive Resilience: Towards a More Inclusive Security Approach in 2025

As a recognised advocate for peacebuilding, Finland's chairpersonship of the OSCE in 2025 provides an opportunity to push for a nuanced balance between soft and hard security. In its priorities, Finland has emphasised resilience, a comprehensive approach to security, a commitment to the core principles of the OSCE, gender equality and the strengthening of operational capacity. All these aspects form a promising framework to work towards nuanced and resilient decision-making processes, which enhance both global and grassroots security outcomes. Finland should capitalise on this opportunity to further integrate the intersectional, complex linkages between SALW and gender within the fieldwork and objectives of the OSCE.

Gender has historically been a controversial issue in the OSCE. However, it was over 20 years of continued advocacy that allowed human rights to gain a common home in OSCE politics. As such, The Women of the First Dimension, could be one advocacy group to support the continued inclusion of gender in OSCE SALW projects.<sup>18</sup> Inclusivity not only takes time, but champions.

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15 Link to full document: <https://www.seesac.org/Roadmap-2030/>. For the Roadmap by 2024 see: <https://www.seesac.org/salw-control-roadmap-seesac/>.

16 See for example: <https://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/579886>.

17 Féron & Väyrynen, *Feminist peace research*, 140.

18 See: <https://osce.usmission.gov/joint-statement-by-the-osce-women-ambassadors-network/>.

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# Etyj suomalaisen ulkopoliitiikan sateentekijänä vai syntipukkina? Etyj politiikan tekijöiden ja Helsingin Sanomien puheissa vuosina 1992 ja 2008.

Essi Ukkonen

## Politiikkasuositukset

Puheenjohtajakaudella 2025 Suomen on mahdollista edistää Etyjin suhteita kansalaisyhteiskuntaan ammentamalla politiikan tekijöiden ja median välisistä historiallisista yhteyksistä:

- Puheenjohtajakautta hallinnoivilla toimijoilla on mahdollisuus syventää Etyjin olemassa olevia suhteita kansallisten mediatoimijoiden kanssa omalla vahvalla taustatyöllä ja aktiivisella vuoropuhelulla.
- Tietoisuuden lisääminen Etyjistä median kautta suomalaisen kansalaisyhteiskunnan kentälle voi antaa osviittaa myös muissa osallistujavaltioissa toimimiseen.
- Myös medialla on paikkansa tietoisuuden lisäämisessä – rooli avoimena tiedonvälittäjänä kansalaisyhteiskunnan ja politiikan tekijöiden yhdistäjänä kannattaa. Julkisen keskustelun ylläpitäminen Etyjistä eri näkökulmat huomioiden voi versoa mielenkiintoa järjestöä kohtaan pitkällä aikavälillä.

Suomi on elänyt murrosten keskellä kylmän sodan päätyttyä: ulkopoliittisten toimijoiden on huomioitava toiminnassaan niin mediakentän avautuminen kuin politiikan käytäntöjen parlamentarisoituminen.<sup>1</sup> Muutokset näkyvät myös Euroopan turvallisuus- ja yhteistyöjärjestö Etyjin toiminnassa Suomen puheenjohtajakaudella vuonna 2025. Suomi keskittyy puheenjohtajana muun muassa ”kuuntelemaan ja tekemään yhteistyötä kansalaisyhteiskunnan kanssa”.<sup>2</sup> Olisikin tärkeää, että Etyjillä on kyky puhutella kansalaisia. Tässä kohtaa medialla on keskeinen rooli tiedonvälittäjänä kansalaisten ja politiikan tekijöiden välillä.

Politiikan tekijöiden ja valtakunnanmedia *Helsingin Sanomien* (HS) välinen yhteys on niin ikään ollut historiallisesti tiivis. Konsensus on näkynyt HS:n myötämielisyydessä eritoten ulkopoliittisia päätöksiä kohtaan.<sup>3</sup> Onkin mielenkiintoista, että HS suhtautuu kriittisesti Etyjiin sen sijaan, että se tukisi poliittisten puheiden positiivista sävyä. Tämä lyhyt katsaus kritiikin ja ylistyksen välimaastoon Etyjistä (ja Etykistä - Euroopan turvallisuus- ja yhteistyökonferenssi ennen vuotta 1995) tarjoaa perspektiivin julkisen keskustelun merkityksestä ulkopoliitikkanteossa. Keskityn merkittäviin nivelkohtiin suomalaisessa Etyj-historiassa, vuoden 1992 Etyk-seurantakokoukseen ja 2008 Suomen Etyj-puheenjohtajakautteen. Perehdyn näkökulmien eroihin analysoimalla HS:n ja politiikantekijöiden julkilausumia 11 poliittisen puheen, 16 lehtiartikkelin ja kahden haastattelun voimin.

## ”Kansainvälinen ympäristö on rajusti muuttunut” – Etyk/Etyj Suomen ulkopoliitikassa kylmän sodan jälkeen

Kylmän sodan päättyminen sai politiikantekijät Suomessa hakemaan uutta suuntaa ulkopoliitikalle. Ulkoministeri Paavo Väyrynen luonnehti tilannetta vuonna 1992: ”Pohjolan kansainvälinen ympäristö on rajusti muuttunut ... Eivätkä Euroopan syvälliset muutokset ole vielä suin-

1 Matti Pesu, *Introducing ideational foreign policy analysis: Explorations of the underlying ideas of Finnish foreign policy*. Väitöskirja. Tampere: Tampereen yliopisto, 2019, 89, 94–95; Lotta Lounasmeri, *Kansallisen konsensuskulttuurin jäljillä: Globalisaatioajan Suomi Helsingin Sanomissa*. Väitöskirja. Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, 2010, 12.

2 Elina Valtonen, *Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs Elina Valtonen at the OSCE's Permanent Council Meeting 19 September 2024*. [https://um.fi/speeches/asset\\_publisher/up7ecZeXFRAS/content/ulkoministeri-elina-valtosen-puhe-etyjin-pysyvan-neuvoston-kokouksessa-19.9.2024/35732](https://um.fi/speeches/asset_publisher/up7ecZeXFRAS/content/ulkoministeri-elina-valtosen-puhe-etyjin-pysyvan-neuvoston-kokouksessa-19.9.2024/35732).

3 Lotta Lounasmeri, ”‘Power investigation’ neglected: The case of the Finnish newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat*” *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2013, 385–386; Pesu, *Introducing ideational foreign policy analysis*, 89.

kaan pysähtyneet, murrosvaihe jatkuu edelleen”.<sup>4</sup> Suomen uusi, kansainvälinen rooli näkyi vahvasti Etykin ja sen edeltäjän toiminnassa, ja Helsingin seurantakokous vuonna 1992 mahdollisti erinomaisesti välittäjäroolin jatkamisen. Kokous kertoi myös optimistisesta hengestä, joka vallitsi kansainvälisessä politiikassa tuona aikana erityisesti Itä-Euroopan maiden keskuudessa.<sup>5</sup> Uudessa aikakaudessa oli kuitenkin myös haasteensa vuoden 1994 jälkeen kun Etykistä tuli Etyj. Muutos ”vakiintuneeksi järjestöksi” muutti suhtautumista. Sen käytännöt muuttuivat byrokraattisemmiksi, eikä järjestön poliittinen relevanssi, saati vallan lähteet olleet enää samalla tasolla vuosituhannen vaihduttua.<sup>6</sup>

Rakenteellisista muutoksista huolimatta Etyj on onnistunut säilyttämään pyrkimyksensä tehdä yhteistyötä kansalaisyhteiskunnan kanssa. Tämä välittyy selvästi myös politiikan tekijöiden puheista, joissa Etyj kehystetään muun muassa ”demokraattisten hallintotapojen” ja ”yhteisten arvojen ja sitoumusten liitoksi”.<sup>7</sup> Kokonaisuudessaan järjestön painoarvo juontaa kuitenkin juurensa sen piirissä kehittyneeseen ”diplomaattiseen rutiiniin”. Etyj ymmärretäänkin politiikantekijöiden keskuudessa eri tavalla kuin mediassa: järjestö tähtää ”luottamuksen ja hyvien käytänteiden ylläpitoon” pitkällä aikavälillä lyhyessä uutissyklissä pysyttelyn sijaan.<sup>8</sup>

Lisäksi on merkittävää, että puheista välittyy halu saada kansalaiset kiinnostumaan ulkopoliittisesta päätöksenteosta.<sup>9</sup> Poliitikantekijöiden ja kansalaisten suhteissa onkin tapahtunut muutos: valtionjohto haluaa huomioida ja vaikuttaa aktiivisesti yleiseen mielipiteeseen Suomessa.<sup>10</sup> Poliittisissa puheissa käsitykset Etyjin asemasta ovat kuitenkin olleet korostuneen positiivisia, vaikka yleinen kiinnostus järjestöä kohtaan on laskenut.<sup>11</sup> Myytit Etyjistä ovatkin jääneet joidenkin politiikan tekijöiden retoriikkaan. Etyjin asemaa ulkopoliitikassa kuvaa esimerkiksi pääministeri Matti Vanhasen puhe 2008: ”Kuten me kaikki hyvin tiedämme, Ety-prosessilla on ollut historiallisesti meille suomalaisille tärkeä merkitys idän ja lännen vastakkainasettelujen lieventäjänä”.<sup>12</sup> Se on esitetty myös ”sampona, joka poiki Suomelle kaikenlaista hyvää” sekä ”ulkopoliittisena läpimurtona” ja ”suomalaisena innovaationa”.<sup>13</sup> Poliitiikan tekijöiden puheiden positiivisuus eroaa HS:n kriittisestä näkökulmasta. Median rooli tiedonvälittäjänä kuitenkin tarkoittaa politiikan tekijöiden intressiä esiintyä julkisuudessa saadakseen tietoisuutta ja legitimitettiä toiminnalleen.<sup>14</sup>

## ”Koska se on olemassa, ei muuta tarvita” – Kriittisen mediakuva merkitys Etyk/ Etyjille

On katsottu, että kylmän sodan päättyminen näkyi mediakentän uudentumisessa avoimuudessa, kun suomettumisen kulttuuri tuli asteittain päätökseensä.<sup>15</sup> HS osoittikin selväsanaisesti ulkopoliitikalle tukensa.<sup>16</sup> Utisoinnista välittyy kuitenkin erilainen kuva Etykistä kuin politiikanteki-

4 Paavo Väyrynen, ”Ulkoasiainministeri Paavo Väyrysen esitelmä 12.3.1992 Tukholmassa Försvarshögskolan’issa”. 12.3.1992. EILEN-arkisto.

5 Matti Vanhanen, ”Pääministeri Matti Vanhanen Suomen suunta 2008 -seminaarissa” 28.1.2008. EILEN-arkisto.

6 Timo Kantolan haastattelu, 6.1.2025. Haastattelija Essi Ukkonen. Tekijän hallussa.

7 Tarja Halonen, ”Tasavallan presidentti Tarja Halosen puhe virallisella Etyj-illallisella Finlandia-talossa” 4.12.2008. EILEN-arkisto; Ks. myös esim. Paavo Väyrynen, ”Ulkoasiainministeri Paavo Väyrysen puheenvuoro EtyKin Helsingin seurantakokouksen avausvaiheessa” 25.3.1992. EILEN-arkisto; Ilkka Kanerva, ”Ulkoministeri Ilkka Kanervan puhe Presidenttifoorumissa” 8.5.2007. EILEN-arkisto.

8 Antti Turusen haastattelu, 18.12.2024. Haastattelija Essi Ukkonen. Tekijän hallussa.

9 Ks. esim. Väyrynen, ”puheenvuoro EtyKin Helsingin seurantakokouksen avausvaiheessa”; Kanerva, ”puhe Presidenttifoorumissa”; Halonen, ”puhe virallisella Etyj-illallisella Finlandia-talossa”; Valtonen, ”Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs Elina Valtonen at the OSCE’s Permanent Council Meeting 19 September 2024”.

10 Pesu, *Introducing ideational foreign policy analysis*, 93, 95–96.

11 Timo Kantolan haastattelu, 6.1.2025.

12 Matti Vanhanen, 28.1.2008. EILEN-arkisto.

13 Matti Vanhanen, 28.1.2008. EILEN-arkisto. Ks. myös esim. Ilkka Kanerva, 8.5.2007. EILEN-arkisto; Ilkka Kanerva, ”Ulkoministeri Kanervan puhe Kalevan ulkopoliitiikan illassa.” 12.11.2007. EILEN-arkisto..

14 Lounasmeri 2013, 384; Herkman, Juha. ”Politiikan julkisuus viestinten välissä: intermediaalisuus ja vaalit” *Media & viestintä*, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2010, 9.

15 David Arter, ”From Finlandisation and post-Finlandisation to the end of Finlandisation? Finland’s road to a NATO application”. *European Security*, Vol. 32., No. 2, 2023, 175; Forsberg, Tuomas ja Matti Pesu. ”The ‘Finlandisation’ of Finland: The Ideal Type, the Historical Model, and the Lessons Learnt” *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 476.

16 Lounasmeri, ”Power investigation’ neglected” 386; Arter, ”From Finlandisation and post-Finlandisation” 186.

jöiden puheissa. Keskeisin kritiikki pohjaa järjestön hyödyllisyyteen uudessa toimintaympäristössä. HS ei esimerkiksi nähnyt aihetta optimismille 1990-luvulla: "Uudessa tilanteessa Eurooppa tarvitsee instituution, joka kykenee ohjaamaan valtioiden mahdollista hajoamista, rajojen muuttamista valtioiden välillä ja ennen kaikkea ratkaisemaan eurooppalaisten valtioiden keskinäisiä aseellisia konflikteja ... Miten Etyk, jonka päätökset perustuvat konsensukselle, voi mennä väliin aseellisissa konflikteissa?"<sup>17</sup> Etyk, ja sitten Etyj, ei lehden silmissä kyennyt lunastamaan siihen kohdistuneita odotuksia kylmän sodan päätyttyä.

Etyjiä oli pidetty potentiaalisena yhteistyöfoorumina etenkin Itä-Euroopan vastaitseenäistyneissä maissa. Suuret odotukset eivät kuitenkaan realisoituneet, ja järjestön haasteet jatkuivat myös Suomen puheenjohtajakaudella 2008. Kautta leimasi joukko kriisejä, joihin vaikuttaminen Etyjin keinovalikoimalla osoittautui vaikeaksi – Georgian sota yhdistettynä finanssikriisiin ja Venäjän yleiseen yhteistyökyvyttömyyteen olivat perustavanlaatuisia ongelmia järjestölle. Suomen vahvuudella kulminoituneet kriisit osoittivat myös optimismin ajan tulleen tiensä päähän.

HS luonnehti Etyjin vaikutusmahdollisuuksia negatiivisesti puheenjohtajakaudella. Se kuvaili järjestön toimintaa "heikentyneeksi" ja "epävarmaksi", ja suhde näkyvimpiin politiikantekijöihin oli jopa avoimen torainen.<sup>18</sup> Pääkirjoitus vuodelta 2008 toteaa lakonisesti, että "koska [Etyj] on olemassa ja toimii, ei muuta tarvita".<sup>19</sup> Kirjoitus kritisoi järjestön kyvyttömyyttä puuttua käsillä oleviin kriiseihin: se pitää järjestön perustavanlaatuisia keinoja riittämättöminä kansainvälisen politiikan ongelmiin. Puheenjohtajakausi alleviivaa HS:n ja politiikantekijöiden välistä eroa. Medialla on mahdollisuus kritisoida avoimesti poliittisia edesottamuksia neljäntenä valtiomahtina, siinä missä politiikantekijät ovat pyrkineet varjelemaan olemassa olevaa diplomaattista rutiinia.

HS:n kritiikki järjestöä kohtaan on monimutkainen yhdistelmä eri kirjoittajien subjektiivisia mielipiteitä ja medialogiikkaan perustuvia päätöksiä. Kokonaisuudessaan lähestymistapa Etyjiin kuitenkin eroaa politiikantekijöistä. Ei siten ole yllättävää, että erot aiheuttavat joskus avointa kitkaa. Toisaalta on selvää, että median ja politiikantekijöiden välinen vuoropuhelu on säilyttänyt paikkansa ulkopoliittisen päätöksenteon vaikutuskanavana. Niiden symbioosi, "molemmipuolinen intressi" pitää Etyjin toimia suomalaisessa poliittisessa julkisuudessa, on vaikuttanut merkittävästi yleisiin käsityksiin järjestöstä.<sup>20</sup> Suomen poliittinen kehitys 2020-luvulla on niin ikään erinomainen esimerkki siitä, että yleisellä mielipiteellä on merkityksensä ulkopoliittisessa päätöksenteossa – ripeä Nato-prosessi on osoitus median, politiikantekijöiden ja julkisen mielipiteen ristipelistä.<sup>21</sup>

## Yhteenveto – Kuka kuuntelee Etyjiä 2020-luvulla?

Etyjin tavoite yhteydestä kansalaisyhteiskuntaan on tärkeä ja tarpeellinen epävarmassa ajassa. Media on keskeisessä roolissa sen saavuttamisessa: ei ole hyväksi kansanvallalle, jos asioita ei nosteta julkiseen keskusteluun.<sup>22</sup> Etyj asettelee sanansa monimutkaistuneen mediaympäristön ja kansainvälisen politiikan ristitulella. Vaikka media on muuttunut merkittävästi vuosista 1992 ja 2008, se tarjoaa edelleen mahdollisuuden Etyjille ylläpitää vuoropuhelua eri toimijoihin. Voi pitää arvokkaana, että medialla on yhteys niin politiikantekijöihin kuin kansalaisyhteiskuntaan. Jakolinja Etyjistä korostaa toimijoiden riippuvuutta toisistaan. Poliitikantekijöillä on jatkossakin intressi olla julkisuudessa. HS on myös antanut tilaa eri näkemyksille Etyjistä.<sup>23</sup> Yhteyksistä on pidettävä kiinni.

17 *Helsingin Sanomat* 4.3.1992, "Helsingin seurantakokous – Etykin hautajaiset?" pääkirjoitus (pk); Ks. myös *Helsingin Sanomat* 7.7.1992, "Miksi?"

18 *Helsingin Sanomat* 30.11.2008, "Helsingin henkikään ei puhaltane uutta lämpöä Venäjä-suhteisiin"; *Helsingin Sanomat* 2.12.2008, "Etyj arvossa arvaamattomassa" pk; *Helsingin Sanomat* 24.12.2008, "Etyillä on edessään vaikeita vuosia" pk; *Helsingin Sanomat* 2.12.2008, "Asenteellisia ja vääristeleviä väitteitä, vastaa ulkoministeri Alexander Stubb".

19 *Helsingin Sanomat* 2.12.2008, "Etyj arvossa arvaamattomassa" pk.

20 Timo Kantolan haastattelu, 6.1.2025.

21 Tuomas Forsberg. "Bottom-up foreign policy? Finland, NATO and public opinion" *Scandinavian Political Studies*, No. 47, 2024, 287, 293–294.

22 Lounasmeri, *Kansallisen konsensuskulttuurin jäljillä*, 4; Lounasmeri "'Power investigation' neglected" 385.

23 Ks. esim. *Helsingin Sanomat* 2.11.1992, "Pieni ihminen, suuri Eurooppa" pk; *Helsingin Sanomat* 30.12.1995, "Otetaan opiksi Natos-ta"; *Helsingin Sanomat* 13.12.2007, "Etyj on yhä tärkeä linkki Venäjän ja lännen välillä".



Median ja politiikantekijöiden välinen asetus ei ole kiveen hakattu – media ennemmin seuraa poliittista päätöksentekoa ja luo sille merkityksiä.<sup>24</sup> Näihin merkityksiin politiikantekijöiden on mahdollista vaikuttaa omilla toimillaan. Kuten Etyjin historia suomalaisessa ulkopoliitikassa osoittaa, on se ollut vahvimmillaan muutosten keskellä. Onkin tärkeää seurata median ja poliittisten päättäjien välistä suhdetta, niin äänessä kuin hiljaisuudessa.

**Essi Ukkonen** on poliittisen historian maisteriopiskelija Helsingin yliopistossa. Hänen tutkimuskiinnostuksensa ovat kansallisen ja kansainvälisen tason institutionaalisessa muutoksessa. Alueellisesti tutkimuskiinnostus keskittyy Itä-Aasian sekä Pohjois-Amerikan tutkimukseen, erityisesti alueiden yhteiskuntahistoriaan ja historian vaikutukseen nykypäivän politiikassa. Mielenkiinnonkohteita heijastelee myös kandidaatintutkielma Kiinan ja Yhdysvaltojen välisistä suurvaltasuhteista (Turun yliopisto, 2024). Se tarkastelee suhteiden lähihistorian retorista ja institutionaalista muutosta. Tämä artikkeli puolestaan erittelee Suomen ulkopoliitiikan ja median välistä suhdetta Etyjin kautta. Se on avaus laajempiin keskusteluihin median roolista julkisen mielipiteen ja politiikkakehysten muovaamisessa.

24 Lounasmeri, *Kansallisen konsensuskulttuurin jäljillä*, 16; Piers Robinson, "The CNN effect: can the news media drive foreign policy?" *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1999, 301–302.

## Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings Through the Inclusion of Financial Investigations. Co-ordination and Dialogue Through the OSCE.

Dorotea Gravellino

### Policy Recommendations

Combatting Human Trafficking highlights the value of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) comprehensive approach to security and how it has developed over the past 20+ years. In maintaining the OSCE's added value on this issue, Finland as OSCE Chairperson in 2025 could:

- Increase the involvement of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) in improving policy coordination in OSCE participating States on trafficking of human beings and anti-money laundering measures.
- Develop an online portal to share best practices between participating States and foster policy coordination to combat human trafficking, building off EU efforts.
- Assist participating States in building capacity to combat trafficking of human beings by sponsoring more simulation-based trainings involving national law enforcement agencies as well as national-based and international financial institutions.
- Foster coordination with participating States when drafting their National Risk Assessments, to encourage the inclusion of anti-trafficking measurements.

Trafficking in human beings (THB) is a growing concern for the global community, including the European region. The UN regards THB as “one of the most lucrative illicit businesses in Europe,” with annual illegal profits reaching \$3 billion.<sup>1</sup> According to Eurostat, in 2022, 10 093 people were registered as victims of THB in the European Union (EU).<sup>2</sup> The EU Commission considers the true number to be “significantly higher” and the highest yearly rate since 2013.<sup>3</sup>

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) supports an intersectional approach to combatting human trafficking, which enables investigators and participating States to develop comprehensive tools to tackle this growing issue. As such, this paper draws attention to the OSCE's work on combatting trafficking in human beings and the organization's focus on connecting THB to anti-money laundry (AML) operations.

Finland has proven to be a forerunner in combatting human trafficking and has received praise from the OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings Dr. Kari Johnstone. Finland's strong policy structures connecting different actors, such as the National Anti-Trafficking Coordinator and an independent National Rapporteur, are highlighted in addressing THB as a multidimensional security issue.<sup>4</sup> This approach supports inclusive policy planning and Finland's commitment to societal resilience.<sup>5</sup>

In light of Finland's 2025 Chairpersonship priorities and the country's stance towards the issue, it is encouraged to continue to develop the OSCE's added value in combatting trafficking in human

1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *Transnational Organized Crime: Let's put them out of business*. <https://www.unodc.org/toc/en/crimes/human-trafficking.html>.

2 Eurostat. *Trafficking in human beings statistics*. Statistics Explained. 2024. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/SEPDF/cache/109463.pdf>.

3 EU Commission. *Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the progress made in the European Union in combatting trafficking in human beings* (fifth report). 20.1.2025. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2025%3A8%3AFIN>.

4 OSCE. *OSCE Special Representative lauds Finland's anti-trafficking structures, calls to enhance child victim identification and forced criminality response*. [Press release], 30.8.2024. <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/575479>.

5 Ministry of Justice, Finland. *Finland fights human trafficking: Action plan against trafficking in human beings*. Publications of the Ministry of Justice, 2021. 24. [https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/163326/OM\\_2021\\_24\\_ML.pdf?sequence](https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/163326/OM_2021_24_ML.pdf?sequence).

beings and money laundering. This could be done by sponsoring topical seminars with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, developing an online portal to share best practices, increasing the number of simulation-based trainings - a method pioneered by the OSCE, and increasing OSCE support for participating States when drafting National Risk Assessments. These recommendations can further develop resilient societies across Eurasia and maintain OSCE expertise on this policy issue.<sup>6</sup>

## Follow the Money: The OSCE's approach to combatting trafficking in human beings

From the start, the OSCE has represented an innovative approach to security, referred to as comprehensive security. Over the past 22 years, comprehensive security has also framed the fight against trafficking in human beings.

In 2003, the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings was established by the OSCE. Trafficking in human beings is an important example of the multi-dimensional security threats that the OSCE attempts to address as it is connected with the rule of law, corruption, inequality, economic deprivation, climate change, and migration.<sup>7</sup> Identifying THB as a multidimensional crime enables policymakers to better address key issues such as financial interests and money-laundering activities that allow THB to sustain. As such, in the 2013 Addendum to the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, participating States agreed on “promoting the use of financial investigations linked with THB-related offences” via national anti-money-laundering authorities to better identify financial activities connected to THB.<sup>8</sup>

Financial investigations are important tools for dismantling trafficking networks as they bridge the public and private sectors and help break THB business models. Subsequently, in 2019 the OSCE Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings presented *Following the money*.<sup>9</sup> This was the first step-by-step guide to include insights and findings inferred from financial investigations into anti-human trafficking strategies. The OSCE advocates an improved dialogue between financial institutions and law enforcement. This encourages participating States to establish partnerships across the public and private sectors and the allocation of resources towards experts' training and societal awareness. Transparency in operations and sourcing for funds is also emphasised. Finland pays due attention to this with regards to clarity on amounts of financing, timeline of work, and responsible funding agencies.<sup>10</sup>

As the OSCE has developed its approach to THB over the past 20 years, the organization increasingly emphasizes co-operation with external partners to advocate financial investigations in combatting THB. For example, the OSCE supports the annual meetings of the National Anti-Trafficking Co-ordinators and Rapporteurs, co-sponsored with the Council of Europe; the Alliance against Trafficking in Persons conference in co-operation with the office of the EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator;<sup>11</sup> and the Financial Intelligence against Human Trafficking project brought forth with Money Laundering Reporting Office of Switzerland (MROS).<sup>12</sup>

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6 OSCE. *Finland's 2025 OSCE Chairpersonship to emphasize the principles and commitments of the OSCE*. [Press release], 19.10.2024. <https://www.osce.org/permanent-council/576522>.

7 UN Office on Drug and Crime. *Global report on trafficking in persons 2022*. [https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/2022/GLOTIP\\_2022\\_web.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/2022/GLOTIP_2022_web.pdf).

8 OSCE. *Addendum to the OSCE action plan to combat trafficking in human beings: One decade later*. PC/Decision no. 1107/Corr.1. 6.12.2013. <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/6/109532.pdf>.

9 OSCE. *Following the money: Compendium of resources and step-by-step guide to financial investigations into trafficking in human beings*, 2019. [https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/5/438323\\_0.pdf](https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/5/438323_0.pdf).

10 OSCE. *Modernizing national action plans to strengthen states' anti-trafficking efforts*, 2023. [https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/0/545419\\_1.pdf](https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/0/545419_1.pdf).

11 OSCE. *Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings 2023 report update*, 2024. <https://www.osce.org/cthb/568459>.

12 OSCE. *First anti-trafficking guide for financial institutions launched by OSCE and Swiss Money Laundering Reporting Office*. [Press release], 26.11.2024. <https://www.osce.org/cthb/581593>.

## Looking ahead: Recommendations and added value

The OSCE's inclusion of financial investigations in combatting THB provides innovative tools for threat management and addressing the roots of human trafficking. The following recommendations can continue to develop the OSCE's unique approach.

First, conferences, topical seminars, or side events at OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) meetings can improve inter-parliamentary collaboration on the inclusion of financial investigations in anti-trafficking initiatives. This would build off initiatives such as a side event from the 2024 OSCE PA Annual Session titled *Legislative action to prevent the misuse of technology for trafficking in human beings*.<sup>13</sup> Finnish Parliamentarian Pia Kauma as President of the OSCE PA is perfectly positioned to promote these initiatives, as well as Finland's legislative progress on this issue.

Second, an online portal, through which participating States could exchange opinions and queries on the use of financial intelligence in combatting THB, should be further investigated. This could increase cooperation and dialogue among OSCE participating States in developing anti-THB policy and further allow information sharing and exchange of best practices. While the EU Commission has developed a similar "anti-trafficking hub" for Member States, a complementary OSCE portal would offer a platform to strengthen anti-human trafficking co-operation from Vancouver to Vladivostok, further addressing the global nature of THB.<sup>14</sup>

Third, the number of specialized joint simulation-based trainings between law enforcement and financial institutions should be increased. This would allow for the strengthening of public/private partnerships and build off already extensive EU training and coordination. The OSCE Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings "has been a pioneer" in developing this multidimensional, joint simulation-based training approach to combatting human trafficking. Exploring ways to develop and finance this model with EU, UN, and national partners should be reflected on.<sup>15</sup>

Fourth, the inclusion of anti-trafficking measures in participating States' National Risk Assessments should be encouraged. The Strategic Analysis Report on Human Trafficking in Cyprus, put forth by the OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings in collaboration with the Cyprus Financial Intelligence Unit, could be a useful example.<sup>16</sup>

In conclusion, the Finnish Chairpersonship for 2025 has the potential to further increase the OSCE's added value in combatting trafficking in human beings throughout the OSCE region and beyond. The OSCE's innovative approach to security has allowed for the improvement of tools to combat this threat by fostering interconnectedness between different international institutions as well as national actors. The inclusion of financial investigations in combatting THB efforts highlights this progress. Connecting and improving these best practices among EU as well as Eurasian OSCE participating States is indeed an added value of the OSCE that should be preserved and developed.

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13 OSCE. *OSCE PA annual session 2024 - side event: Legislative action to prevent the misuse of technology for trafficking in human beings*, 2.7.2024. <https://www.osce.org/cthb/571717>.

14 EU Commission. *Report - Progress made in the European Union in combatting trafficking in human beings*.

15 For more on anti-trafficking simulation-based training exercises, see: <https://www.osce.org/cthb/simulation-based-training>.

16 OSCE. *Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings 2023 report update*.

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# Jatkuvuudesta kriinkestävyyteen: Suomen puheenjohtajakaudet Etyjissä 2008 ja 2025

Julia Niinistö

## Politiikkasuositukset

Suomen kahden Etyj-puheenjohtajakauden prioriteetit, 2008 jatkuvuus ja 2025 kriinkestävyys, heijastuksina Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan kehityskulusta.

- Muutosten ja jatkuvuuksien pohtiminen auttaa havainnoimaan Suomen ulkopoliitiikan painopisteitä. Katsauksen luominen historiallisiin kehityskulkuihin voi olla avuksi tulevaisuuden ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan suuntaviivoja luodessa.

Vuodet 2008 ja 2025 muodostavat omanlaisensa merkkipaalat Suomen ulkopoliitiikan historiassa, molempia vuosia yhdistäessä Suomen Etyj-puheenjohtajakausi. Kausien ohjelmien vertailu avaa mielenkiintoisen ikkunan Suomen ja laajemmin Euroopan turvallisuuspolitiikan muutoksen tarkasteluun. Suomen toiminta Etyjissä on raporttien tarkastelun perusteella muuttunut jatkuvuuden [continuity] korostamisesta ja kehittämisestä kriinkestävyyteen [resilience].<sup>1</sup> Jatkuvuutta on pyritty edistämään sekä uudistamalla Etyjin rakenteita, että vakiinnuttamalla instituutiota osana eurooppalaista turvallisuutta, kun taas kestävyden korostaminen ilmenee Etyjin vahvistamisena ja erityisesti sen kriinkestävyyden parantamisena.<sup>2</sup>

Puheenjohtajakausia värittävät tietyt samankaltaisuudet, kuten Itä-Euroopassa tapahtuneet aseelliset konfliktit, joissa osapuolena on ollut Venäjä; vuonna 2008 Georgian sodassa, 2014 Krimin miehityksessä ja 2022 Venäjän täysmittaisessa hyökkäyksessä Ukrainaan, ja tästä käynnistyneessä Venäjän hyökkäyssodassa Ukrainassa. Konfliktien ”ratkaiseminen” aseellisesti ei ole poistunut Venäjän neuvottelupöydältä sitten 2008. Maan ulkopoliitiikan seurannasta ja sen tavoitteiden tutkimisesta on tullut vaikeampaa, valtion sulkeutuessa yhä enenevissä määrin.<sup>3</sup> Etyj puolestaan on, erityisesti 2009 Korfun prosessin myötä, pyrkinyt ottamaan aktiivisempaa roolia tahona, joka suojelee Euroopan rauhaa vahvistamalla maiden keskinäisiä suhteita.<sup>4</sup> Vaikka Etyjin ja Venäjän intressit ovat näennäisen vastakkaisia, on Etyj yksi harvoista monikansallisista instituutioista, joissa Venäjä on vielä mukana.

Tulevan puheenjohtajakauden kannalta on tärkeää luoda ratkaisuja siihen pulmaan, miten Etyj voi nyt ja jatkossa toimia sellaisten valtioiden välisen keskustelun mahdollistajana, jotka eivät muuten löytäisi toisiaan samasta neuvottelupöydästä. Vaikka Venäjä voi veto-oikeutta käyttämällä lamauttaa Etyjin toimintaa, maan osallisuus voi myös samalla valottaa maata ja sen ulkopoliitikkaa, joista on vaikeaa saada ajankohtaista ja totuudenmukaista tietoa.<sup>5</sup> Vertailemalla Suomen kahden Etyj-puheenjohtajakauden ohjelmia ja ajankohtaisien konfliktien vaikutusta Euroopan turvallisuustilanteeseen, on mahdollista hahmottaa ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittista muutosta siinä, minkälaisena toimijana Venäjä koetaan Suomen ja Euroopan turvallisuuden kannalta.

1 Ulkoministeriö, Suomen Etyj-puheenjohtajakauden ohjelma 2025. [https://um.fi/documents/35732/0/PJ-kauden+ohjelma\\_taitto\\_fin.pdf/6b7df0f4-8b67-3288-4af7-3a554456a322?t=1736410466215](https://um.fi/documents/35732/0/PJ-kauden+ohjelma_taitto_fin.pdf/6b7df0f4-8b67-3288-4af7-3a554456a322?t=1736410466215); Ulkoministeriö, ”Suomi aloittaa Etyjin puheenjohtajana” Ulkoministeriön verkkosivut, 1.1.2025. [https://um.fi/ajankohtaista/-/asset\\_publisher/gc654PySnjTX/content/suomi-aloittaa-etyjin-puheenjohtajana](https://um.fi/ajankohtaista/-/asset_publisher/gc654PySnjTX/content/suomi-aloittaa-etyjin-puheenjohtajana).

2 Ulkoministeriö, ”Suomi aloittaa Etyjin puheenjohtajana.”

3 Mikhail Polianskii, ”Russian foreign policy research and war in Ukraine: Old answers to new questions?” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2024, 156-172.

4 Etyj, ”Restoring trust: the Corfu Process” 1.12.2010. <https://www.osce.org/mc/87193>.

5 Etyj, ”Human rights situation in Ukraine deteriorates as attacks intensify amid ongoing persecution in Russian-occupied territories: OSCE human rights office” 13.12.2024. <https://www.osce.org/odihr/583345>.



## 2008

2008 puheenjohtajakautta ja sen tavoitteita kehystettiin Etyjin ja sen toiminnan jatkuvuuden ja uudistamisen kautta. Silloinen valtiosihteeri Pertti Torstila, sanoi Suomen puheenjohtajakauden alkupuolella: "In Finland's view, every international organization should review its work in order to remain relevant and useful to its membership. In this respect, Finland believes that it is important to welcome a discussion on these and other issues this year. Together, we should work constantly to adapt the OSCE to new times and new needs, as we have done so many times before throughout the history of the Organization."<sup>6</sup>

Etyjin uudistaminen oli kuitenkin lopulta kauden sivuosassa; vuonna 2008 syttynyt Georgian sota vaikutti merkittäväällä tavalla myös Etyjiin ja Suomen puheenjohtajakautteen. Georgian sota on mahdollista nähdä osana laajempaa jatkumoa Venäjän ulkopoliitiikan kehityksessä aggressiivisemman suuntaa, kuten vuoden 2014 Ukrainan Krimin niemimaan miehitykselle. Rajanveto oli Georgian sodan myötä selkeämpi kuin koskaan Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen: Venäjä kertoi, mihin rajansa vetää läntisen vaikutuksen, kuten mahdollisen NATOn laajentumisen suhteen. Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikan kannalta NATO-jäsenyys onkin huomattava ero menneen ja nykyisen puheenjohtajakauden välillä.

Verrattuna puheenjohtajakauden alkuun, Suomen tavoitteet Etyjin suhteen muuttuivat selkeästi Georgian sodan myötä. Silloisen ulkoministeri Alexander Stubbin tunnetuksi tullessa, ja jopa kohauttaneessa, päivämäärän mukaan nimensä saaneessa 080808-puheessa, hän sanoi: "Loppukesän viikot elokuun 8. päivästä alkaen ovat kuluneet Georgian kriisin selvittelyissä. Olemme koettaneet tehdä Etyj-puheenjohtajana parhaamme. Ensin tulitauon aikaansaamiseksi yhdessä EU-puheenjohtaja Ranskan kanssa. Sitten tulitaukoa tukevan Etyjin sotilastarkkailumission käynnistämiseksi. Kolmas vaihe - laajemman kansainvälisen toiminnan rakentaminen ja ratkaisuyritysten aika - on nyt edessä. Korostan, ettei kriisi vielä ole ohi. Sen lopputulos ja poliittiset jälkijäritykset ovat vielä näkemättä."<sup>7</sup> Tämä lausunto kaikuksi vielä vuosia.

Neuvottelijan roolissa toimiminen Neuvostoliiton jälkeisen ajan konfliktissa, jossa osapuolena oli kuitenkin myös Venäjä, on ollut osa selkeää muutosta Suomen kylmän sodan aikaiseen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikkaan.<sup>8</sup> Suomen toiminta Georgian sodan aikana voidaan nähdä osana kehityskulkuna maan ulkopoliitiikan muutoksessa reaktiivisesta proaktiiviseen.

## 2025

Puheenjohtajakauden kattoteemana on kestävyys ja erityisesti kriisinkestävyys. Teemaa tukevat puheenjohtajaohjelman kolme pääperiaatetta: Etyjin periaatteiden ja sitoumusten kunnioittaminen, nykyhaasteisiin vastaaminen ja Etyjin vahvistaminen tulevaisuuden varalle. Suomi korostaa myös Helsingin periaatteita ja niiden noudattamista, yhdenlaisena vastalauseena Venäjän sodankäynnille Ukrainassa.<sup>9</sup> Tavoitteet eroavat 2008 puheenjohtajakaudesta, jolloin jatkuvuuden ajatus oli tavoitteiden keskiössä. Venäjää ei tuolloin pidetty turvallisuusuhkana, tai ainakaan sellaisena kuin maa ja sen toiminta nyt Euroopassa koetaan.

Nykyinen ulkoministeri Elina Valtonen, joka toimii Etyjin puheenjohtajana 2025, on sanonut: "Monenkeskisen järjestelmän toimivuus on Suomen etu. Vuoden 2025 puheenjohtajuuden tavoitteemme on vahvistaa Etyjiä maailman laajimpana turvallisuusjärjestönä. Teemme valmisteluja vai-

6 Pertti Torstila, "The OSCE in 2008: Challenges and perspectives, Secretary of State Speech" *International Relations and Political Science University of Vilnius*, 11.2.2008. <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/7/30749.pdf>.

7 Alexander Stubb, "Ulkoministeri Alexander Stubbin puhe" 25.8.2008. EILEN-arkisto.

8 Anneli Taina, "Ministeri Anneli Taina everstiluutnantti Olli-Matti Multamäen teoksen 'Suomi ja Afganistanin rauhanprosessi 1987-1989' julkistamistilaisuudessa Smolnassa maaliskuun 19. päivänä 1996." 19.3.1996, EILEN-arkisto.

9 Suomen Etyj-puheenjohtajakauden ohjelma 2025.

keassa tilanteessa, jossa yksi osallistujavaltio käy laajamittaista hyökkäyssotaa toista vastaan.”<sup>10</sup> Ukrainan sodan myötä puhe Venäjästä on selkeästi koventunut, mikä on näkynyt myös poliittisissa päätöksissä. Retorisesti Venäjän nimittäminen turvallisuushaksi on hyväksyttyä – mitä se ei ollut muutama vuosi sitten. Toisaalta Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikka on jo pitkään nojannut eurooppalaisen turvallisuuden kehittämiseen, erinäisten monikansallisten instituutioiden, kuten Etyjin, EU:n ja nyt myös NATOn kautta. Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikka suhteessa Venäjään ovat muuttuneet, mutta dialogissa itänaapuriin nähdään samalla oma arvonsa, sen tapahtuessa Helsingin periaatteiden mukaisesti. Joka tapauksessa, 2008 ajatus jatkuvuudesta ei ole sellaisenaan enää tavoiteltu asia. Muuttuva turvallisuuspoliittinen tilanne vaatii reagointia, ja 2025 puheenjohtajakausi mahdollistaa Suomelle uudenlaisen tilan, jossa navigoida maan suhtautumista Venäjään.

## Johtopäätökset

2008 puheenjohtajakautena esiin nostetut demokraattiset arvot ja konfliktinratkaisu ovat edelleen tärkeitä asioita 2025. Eroavaisuudet kausien prioriteeteissa näkyvät kuitenkin siinä, miten edellä mainittuja asioita kehystetään, ja miten niitä edistetään. Jos kestävyys ja kriisinkestävyys ovat päätavoitteita, implikoi kehystys, että kestävyyttä kehitetään joltain vastaan tai joltakin suojautumiseksi. Vaikka Venäjä ei ole ainut turvallisuushaka, on se Suomen ja Euroopan näkökulmasta yksi huomattavimmista. Toisaalta kestävyys on laaja ja monitulkintainen käsite; yhtä lailla käsitteen avoimuus voi toimia kutsuna Venäjälle palata vastuulliseksi toimijaksi lopettamalla sodankäynnin ja vahvistamalla maan demokratiaa. Kriisinkestävyttä kehittämällä voidaan suojautua myös muita turvallisuushakia vastaan, ei ainoastaan Venäjää vastaan. 2025 kauden ajatus kriisinkestävyydestä ei juuri jätä tilaa uudistamiselle. Kestävyyttä parannettaessa keskitytään jo olemassa olevien asioiden kehittämiseen ja vahvistamiseen. Uudistaminen implikoi vanhojen toimintatapojen uudelleentarkastelua ja mahdollisesti niistä luopumista tai niiden muuttamista. Omalla tavallaan uudistaminen voi asettaa Etyjin haavoittuvaiseen asemaan. Kriisinkestävyyden retoriikka vaikuttaa kaiken kaikkiaan tätä vasten loogiselta vastaukselta kriisin ajan haasteisiin.

Ilmapiiri Euroopassa on ilmeisen jännittynyt, muttei toivoton. Etyjillä on mahdollisuus profiloitua aktiiviseksi rauhanedistäjäksi Euroopassa. Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikan kannalta Etyj on osa eurooppalaisen turvallisuuden ja sen parantamiseen tähtäävää politiikkaa. Uusi NATO-jäsenyys ja Etyj voivat olla Suomelle mahdollisuus löytää toisiaan täydentäviä tapoja kehittää turvallisuuspolitiikkaa ja edistää rauhaa Euroopassa.

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10 Ulkoministeriö, "Suomi perustaa uudelleen pysyvän edustuston Euroopan turvallisuus- ja yhteistyöjärjestöön" 8.12.2023. [https://finlandabroad.fi/web/geo/ulkoministerion-tiedotteet/-/asset\\_publisher/kyaK4Ry9kbQ0/content/suomi-perustaa-uudelleen-pysyvan-edustuston-euroopan-turvallisuus-ja-yhteistyöjärjestöön/35732](https://finlandabroad.fi/web/geo/ulkoministerion-tiedotteet/-/asset_publisher/kyaK4Ry9kbQ0/content/suomi-perustaa-uudelleen-pysyvan-edustuston-euroopan-turvallisuus-ja-yhteistyöjärjestöön/35732).





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